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‘Model’ or ‘tool’? New definitions for translational
research
Hazel Sive1
Summary
The term ‘model’ often describes non-human biological systems
that are used to obtain a better understanding of human disorders.
According to the most stringent definition, an animal ‘model’ would
display exactly the same phenotype as seen in the relevant human
disorder; however, this precise correspondence is often not present.
In this Editorial, I propose the alternative, broader term ‘tool’ to
describe a biological system that does not obviously (or precisely)
recapitulate a human disorder, but that nonetheless provides useful
insight into the etiology or treatment of that disorder. Applying the
term ‘tool’ to biological systems used in disease-related studies will
help to identify those systems that can most effectively address
mechanisms underlying human disease. Conversely, differentiating
‘models’ from ‘tools’ will help to define more clearly the limitations
of biological systems used in preclinical analyses.
Defining a ‘tool’
I define a ‘model’ as an animal or other biological system that
precisely recapitulates a human disorder, exhibiting what seems to
be an identical phenotype to that seen in affected humans. Applying
this stringent criterion, models of human disorders are rare,
because the biology of a given animal or other biological system
and a human is not identical, and/or because the molecular players
underlying the disorder have not been fully defined. However, a
specific term applying to biological systems that do not completely
recapitulate a human disorder, yet are still relevant for studying it,
is currently lacking. In order to address this deficit, I therefore define
a ‘tool’ as a biological system that gives insight
into a human disorder, without obviously
recapitulating the phenotype that is diagnostic
of that disorder. In order to be useful, the tool
must have attributes that are not accessible in
other systems – for example, it might provide
the opportunity to perform rapid and
inexpensive analysis of changes in the activity
of human genes (or homologs) that are
associated with the disorder, genetic modifier
screens to identify interacting players, and/or
chemical screens to identify potential
therapeutic targets. However, the overarching notion is that similar
or identical molecular pathways should underlie the phenotype
observed in either tool or model as are affected in the human
disorder. Therefore, both tools and models are relevant for
dissecting some of the mechanisms underlying that disorder.
Is it a tool or a model?
Some biological systems are clearly models, whereas others are
clearly tools. Since the crucial consideration in determining whether
a given system is a model or a tool is the specific phenotype
observed, even a simple animal can be a precise model. For
example, in studies of memory and learning, the sea snail Aplysia
can be considered a model for human memory, because the final
output – memory formation – is the same in both species (for a
review, see Bailey and Kandel, 2008).
Animal systems used to analyze the etiology of cancer include
those that appear to accurately copy the human tumor phenotype.
For example, non-small cell lung carcinomas (Kim et al., 2005) and
some cases of soft tissue sarcoma in which the human disorder
shows simple karyotypes (Dodd et al., 2010) appear to be
phenocopied in mice, which would therefore be termed ‘models’.
However, for other cancers, mouse phenotypes do not precisely
copy the human tumor, often because the full cohort of genes
contributing to the human cancer is not known, and/or because
the methods used to develop the tumor do not reflect the human
case (Frese and Tuveson, 2007). For example, this is the case for
soft tissue sarcomas with complex karyotypes (Dodd et al., 2010),
or for any cancer using xenografts of human tumor cells
transplanted into ectopic sites of immunodeficient mice, where a
human tumor forms, but in an environment that is quite different
to that of the normal tumors in humans (Frese
and Tuveson, 2007). These cases would be
classified as ‘tools’.
Even in cases where genetic players have
been conclusively identified, the phenotypic
outcome of disrupting specific genes may be
different in different animal species. For
example, the pathology of Fanconi anemia (FA)
is caused by abnormalities in a complex of 13
human proteins, each encoded by a different
gene, many of which have been studied at the
level of their molecular function (all are
involved in DNA interstrand cross-link repair) (Kee and D’Andrea,
2010). Although almost all human FA homologs are found in most
multicellular animals, and several are present in yeast, the final
outcomes of disrupting their function in these systems does not
precisely recapitulate the human outcome. For example, the
Caenorhabditis elegans genome definitively encodes four of the 13
human genes associated with FA, and may include several other
homologs (McVey, 2010), but worms do not have a hematopoietic
system equivalent to that of humans, and so cannot develop
anemia nor display the complex FA-associated developmental
defects seen in humans with the disorder. Therefore, although
C.  elegans is an excellent genetic tool with which to study the
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“The tool definition allows
an honest and rigorous
assessment of both the
useful characteristics and
the limitations of an
experimental system in
studying a human
disorder”
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function of some individual FA genes, it cannot be defined as a
precise phenotypic model of the disorder.
For human mental health disorders, most non-human animal
systems do not yield a phenotype equivalent to the human
behavioral changes associated with the disorder. In the case of
autism, for example, several risk genes have been identified in
humans (e.g. Weiss et al., 2008), and homologous genes are present
in the zebrafish. However, in analyses of these genes, the zebrafish
should be defined as a tool, as fish do not have the behavioral
repertoire, or perhaps even the brain regions, that are responsible
for the human autistic phenotype (Blaker-Lee et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, if perturbing a zebrafish homolog of a gene known
to confer autism risk in humans results in a specific measurable
phenotype in zebrafish, and expression of the human gene rescues
the phenotype, then the zebrafish is useful for assaying the activity
of human variants associated with autism. Furthermore, the
modified zebrafish can be used to carry out chemical screens to
define factors that modulate the function of autism risk genes, and
thereby help to define potential therapeutic targets. The fish is thus
a valuable tool for autism research.
Importance of the tool definition
The ‘tool’ definition is useful for two related reasons. First, the
definition may encourage investigators to develop their biological
system for experimental analysis of a specific disorder, which was
not considered previously because the system was not an obvious
model. Second, the tool definition allows an honest and rigorous
assessment of both the useful characteristics and the limitations
of an experimental system in studying a human disorder.
Together, the above points are relevant for justifying grant
applications pertaining to translational research, in which the
applicability of an animal-based or other biological system is
crucial. On the one hand, the tool definition allows the applicant
to suggest that a particular system is useful for addressing the
etiology or treatment of a human disorder without feeling the need
to claim that the system recapitulates the disorder itself. For
example, mutations in the -synuclein protein are tightly associated
with Parkinson’s disease, leading to formation of fibrillar plaques
in human cells, and abnormal ER-to-Golgi trafficking in both yeast
and human cells expressing proteins with the same mutation (for
a review, see Auluck et al., 2010). Since yeast cells do not get
Parkinson’s disease, they would be classed as a tool; however, as a
tool they have great potential to identify genes and small molecules
that can modulate plaque formation at the cellular level. On the
other hand, successful preclinical use of a biological tool requires
a stringent level of justification for the proposed use of the tool.
This includes a thorough analysis of how it will be used to examine
the disorder – and some systems are better than others for certain
approaches. For example, Drosophila might be excellent for genetic
modifier screens, to identify suppressors of a lethal phenotype
caused by mutation of a human disease gene homolog (e.g.
Kucherenko et al., 2008), but might not be useful for identifying
behavioral or anatomical brain phenotypes associated with a
specific mutation found in human patients, as the fly brain differs
so significantly from the vertebrate brain.
A tool-model continuum
Here, I have proposed that the tool versus model definition can
identify the relative utility of specific biological systems in
translational studies. However, in some cases it will not be clear
whether to label a system a tool or a model, because sufficient
comparative data might not be available. The purpose of these
definitions is not to box a given system as a model or tool, but
rather to highlight more accurately where and how a system might
be valuable. The most useful framework may therefore be a tool-
model continuum, whereby the systems at one end are clearly tools
(showing no phenotypic resemblance to the human disorder,
except with respect to homology to the underlying gene or
molecular pathway) and those at the other end are clearly models
(which so closely resemble a human disease as to be
indistinguishable from it). Between these two endpoints is a
continuum – perhaps the ‘tool-model index’, although this would
be difficult to quantify. A biological system that lies at any point
along the continuum can be useful in studying a human disorder,
as long as the application of the system is carefully considered and
justified. Formalizing the previously unstated notion of an animal
‘tool’ in analysis of human disease will diminish constraints on
which non-human biological systems are considered useful for
translational research, which will be enriched through extending
the repertoire of systems and approaches that are available.
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